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NOTE.AND COMMENT
DECLAKATO:a.Y JuDGKENTS.-~e wtdespread interest in this l)Cw form of
remedial instrument,· which was. somewhat" dashed by the recent decision of
the Mic.hi~ Su.Prem~ Court in :Anway v. Grarrtl Rapitls·-Ry. Co. (r920),
211 Mit;h. 592, holding d~oiy relie£ to bC non-judicial and ·outside the
constitutional power of courts (19 MICH. I.Aw REY. 26); has been revived
by the action of' the lcgistature of. Kansas in enacting a detlaratory judg:
ment statute almost identical with the .Michigan act_. This was done with
full knowledge ot the decision in the Ammy case~ and ina5much ·a!i .it ii
knoym° tm,t some of the.Judge$ ot ·the Supreme Court of Kansas have
taken an active interest in advocating this re"form, it is fair to assume th:!.t
the act is Ilkcly tQ escape the constitUtional ·gtiillotine· The English Judges.
havo for two generations or m9re been the .chid pr:o_ponents .of English procedural° .reform,· and. nothing w~tld be more unlves:sally wetoomed. in this
country than the getierQUs participation and leadership of our high. judges
in the efforts of·the public to. make· t.h~ administration of justice '11PZ:e responsive to social
Tl_ie n~w Kansas act: known as the ·Hcgl~-llarvey Bill, was signed by
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.
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the governor on February 17, 1921, to become almo11t immediately operative.
The text of the act, which may be compared with the Michigan act (Pub.
A~ 1920. ~o. 150), printed in full in 17 MtCHIGAlf LAW IUvuw 6Qf, is ..
follows:
.
AN Ac:t Relating ta Declaratory Judgments.
Be II Enacted by the Legislature of jhe State of Kansas:
SECTION. 1. In q.scs of actual controversy, courts of record, within the
scope of their respective. jurisdictions, shall have power to make bin~
adjudications· of right, whether or not consequential relief is, or at the tiine
co.uld be, claimed, and no action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the. ground that a judgment or order merely declaratory "of right ii
prayed for•. ·Controversies involving the interpretation of deeds, wills, other
instruments of writing, statutes, municipal ordinanceJ, and other governmental regulations,. zm7 be so determined, and this enumeration does. not
exclude other instances of actu:il antagoni~tic assertion ~d denial of right.
SECTION 2. Declaratory .judgments maY. be obtained and reviewed as
other judgments, according ·to the eode of civil.procedure.
SECTION a. Farther relief baSe:d on a declaratory judgment may be
granted wJ:ienever ~ecessary or proper. The application shall be hy ~ticn
to
court liavipg jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application ~
deemed suflicient, ·the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse
party whose rights have been adjudicated _by the declaration of right to show
cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith. .
SECTION .c. When a declaration of right or the grantfog of funher relief
based thereon shall involve the determination of issues _(If fact triable by a
jury, such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatorin.
with proper instr~~ons by the court, w~etber " general verdict be reqqired

a
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SECTION

:·
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.

T.he parties to a proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment

may stipulate with reference to the allowance of ·costs, and in the absence

"of such stipulation the court may make such an award of costs as may seem
equitalite and just.
,
·
SECTION 6. This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to afford
relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over
legal rights, without requiring one of the p~9 .interest~ so· to invade the
rights asserted by the · ot!Jcr as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary
action therefor; and it is to be libetally interpreted and administered, with
a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people..
·
SECTION 7. This. act shall take effe.ct on publication in the official state
paper.
This act in terms. confines the power. of making binding declarations of
rights to· "actual controversies,'' a limitation which is doubtless inherent and
up0n which the English courts have always acted in adminiS!ering this remcd7. It expressly includes "statutes; municipal 01dinances.and other y.ovcmmcntal regulations• among the subjects for declaratory interpretation, which
is probably an improvement upon the Michigan aet, which included them
only by implication. as the English rules do. And it makes clearly specific
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its purpose io enable parties to know .their legal rights without rcquirinc,
as the law has heretofore generally required. the commission or threat of a
wrongful act as a condition precedent to judicial action.
E. R. S.
.Al>XUtAl.TY Rl."!.E oF "CARE, CtiJtF. AND WACF.s" AS ..\PH.m> TO rar GR!AT
LAus.-It has been the rule in admiralty Jaw from ancient ~mes that the
vessel ·and her owners are liable in case a seaman falls sick or is wotmded
in· the serVice of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure and to
hiS wages, but to no further compensation as dama~ U."llcss the ship wu
unseaworthy or. there was neglect in furnishing ~re and cure. LAws oP
WJSJsY, Article 18; Ruu:s OF OuaoK, Article VI; LAws .OF TH! HANS£
TowNs, Article
MAlltNt: OiiDINANCES, I.oms XIV, Bk. Ill. Title 4o
Article n; 2- Pet. Admiralty Decisions; Tlst Osceola, 189 U. S. 158; Tl<'
Troo1, n8 Fed. 769•
.
Questions have arisen, however, as to. the extent of the liability f!>r
maintenance and cure and as to how Jong after the injury the sailor is entitled
to paymept of \ovages. It is ~ettled that "cure" does n~t mean complete res~
ration or healing,- but refers rather to care and attention. ln Nevitt v. Clarie,
Olcott 316 (Fc4. ~. No. 10,138). it was held that the privilege of being
cured contiriues no longer· than the right to wages under the contract in the
particular case. In Tlst Bm Flilcl, & Ahb t:. S. 126, the claim to be cured
at the expense of the ship is held to be applicable to seamen employed· C111
the lakes and navigable rivers within the United States. A point long ·in
-dispute has been the question· of wages dne the seaman after the injwy~
ThiS now appears definitely decided. as to the l:;reat Lakes in cases where
there .enters no clement of unseaw"orthiness, and where the seaman ships for
a certain voyage. In Grtot Lakts Slramslsil Cornpan)• v. Gtigtr (Circuit
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit), decided November S. 1919, r~1>0rted in
261 Federal Reporter, at page 275. a seaman. after signing regular articles,
shipped at a Lake Erie P<'rt for a round trip to the head of Lake Superior
and return: During the voyage; while aiding in closing the hatches, libehnt's
finger was caugnt in the operating mechanism and so crushed that it had to
be amputated. There was no question of unseaworthines'- the ~le cause of
the accident being the negligence of other members of the crew. Care and
cure were furnished at the expense ·of the steamer and his wages were paid
to the end of the voyage, that is, untt1 the return of the steamer to Lake
Erie. Libelant claimed wages and maintenance for the entire period be was
disabled, about three months. The question on appeal_ was wh~hcr libctaot
was entitled to ~Jlowance filr wages after the end of the voy:ige and whether
interest should be allowed.
·
After deciding. that the injury here was maritime and within the jurisdiction of admiralty, "and reiterating the general rule of care, cure and
wages, th~ cotirt considered the earlier cases on the !>nbiect and i:ttmed to
qualify fo some· extent the rule of duration of care and cure set forth in
Ntflitt v. Clarkt~ .rHpra, in cases where either it had been commenced and is
in a .cour~ of favorable termination or the ship had Mt given due attcntico
to the seaman's necessities, or the
bad bce1i impropttly treated: at Ulf
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rate, the appel~e court upheld the district court's award for mairttmance
for _the period libcla,nt was di!\llbled, thirteen weeks-at $ro ptt week. sarinii
the award was proper .and that libelant was entitled to interest thereon from
the time its payment was due. . As to wages, the c6urt found that libclant's
shipment contract did not extend beyond the termination of the voyage. and
limited· his wages to ~e en!! .of the ·voyage, ~aying they did not decide what the
rule would .be had the ~ontract of employment extended beyond· the end
the ·Voya&e.
.
~ G. Gt1£TZ
Detrtlii. !ficliigtn1.

of

"BRJNCJNC! TBDD PAR'tleS JN1o·ACTIO.NS "AT l.AW-'SET~ ACAINST TH!
- AssICNOR.-It frequently happens, in an action by an -a"ssigncc, that.the defendant wishes to use· as a cross-action a claim against the· assigtior. This results
. in no diffitulty .unless the amount·.of the set-off ai.tinst tire as~ignor is greater.
than the claim "of the plaintiff, or unless the cross-action calls for a specific
remedy against the assigner in addition tO ~ts ddensi~e effect upon the plaintiff's demand." In each of these cases we ·have a thrce..:sidcd contrC>versy.
In the firs~ the set-off operates against the plaintiff to th~ "extent ."of bis
claim and aPinst · the assignor for the balance.' In the second; tlic crossaction o~tes against the plaintiff al}d"his assignC?r in Wayll"wbich may be
quite variously· differcilt: If the assignor can. he brought into the controversy, it can be wholly determined in a single action; otherwise two or more
acti011s are· necessary.
·
·
·
.
In Sta_te ex t;el.Aici.rka Pacific Navigaiion Co.' v. S11ptrior Collrl (Wash.,
·1920), 194 Pac. 412, there was an· examjlle of the first of these two case.<
.The plaintiff ~ assignee ·of an aceount solely for collection and .. claimed
· no ·beneficial interest .in it. The defen~ant bad a cross-demand against the
assignor arising out of the sanie .contract· which produced the account :nie-J
·upon, .and this cross-demand exceeded the amount of the plaintiffs claim.
It wa,s obvious that the defendant could not get a judgment for a balance in
bis favor• against jhe plaiJ!tiff, brit ~t this could- be obtained, !f at all. only
..against the assign_or. Under a familiar statute :providing that where a complete cletermlliation of the controversy cannot be bad w!thout the. presence
of ~thcr parties, the cqurt shall cause them to be brought in, the detendant
asked that the action be stayed until the assignor- should be brought in.
Retusit to ~e this order was affirmed on appeal, the court· holdirig that
this. l)tatute referred to .necessary parties in the tt'Chn~cal sense of that term,
and in an action at Jaw, where the defendant makes use of a IC'gal counter-·
ctaim. no.third party_ can be· riecessary.
·
The point of interest in this decision· is not i:o untqi whether it =s right
on. authority as whether: it can be justified on broad principles of procedural
policy•. · It brings up several interesting questions affecting the nature of
actions and the relation of parties thereto, and illustrates the extreme antipathy with which professional· ,conservatism meets proposals for even .the
most natural and simple.changes in judicial administr.iticn.
J. We have here a three-sided legal controversy. The commlln law
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·was in theory wcdded:to the i!lea of a t~O-sided c~trciversy as the essential
condition for judicial action. One plaintiff or a unified group of joint pl~
tiffs must s~e a single defendant or a unified gr~up of joint defendants.
This principle lies at the foundation· of the whole scheme of. parties in common law actions. In the case .of two plaititiffs, if their interests are several
they cannot bring a single action to enforce tlieir rights,· thtrs dcvelopuig a
three-sided controversy, but• each must bring a separate two-sided action.
GouLD oN .PtEADmc:, ·ch. IV, Sec. SJ. In ease of two defendants, if their
liability is several,. each must ~- a .sole defcn~t in a· separate tw9-sid"ed
action, and bOth cannot be joined in ·a three-sided controversy•. JO Cvc. 120.
If tJiis doctrine of unity .of parties is hued on the_ idea «>f preserving
singleness in the issue, the··effort is ·vain~ ~use· by the· use of numerou~
counts and pleas-many issues may arise in a .single action. If it is based oa
the supposed impossibili~ of splitting up a. judgment so as to determine a
controversy wjth more than two sides,. it"inay be answered that the eommon
law did in fact tolerate judgments .which .determined _legal relations among.
three or more parties. In Stymour v. Richard.son Futling Co. (1903), 2J5
Ill. 'J'l, ilie court quotes .inany common>;;law authorities in support of the
proposition that while the general rule is that the judgment .must be a unit..
as to all the defen~ts in assumpsit, yet "if one· defendant pleads matter
which goes to. bis personal discharge, such as ban~ptcy, Or' to his personal
disability to contract, such as infancy, or any other matter which does not
go to the- nature of the wlit," judgment may bC render~ for such 4efendant
and againSt the- rc5t. So,"whefe two or more arc charged -!1-ith a joint tort.
one inay be founcl gliitty and aiiotlici acquitted,. as the evidence may rcq1*'e~ CH~TrY ON PI.!ADING, •74- And" even in th~ Case of"joint plaintiffs, where
they are uriited tJirougb common interest, one,may. Dbtain a judgment in
hi~ fa.vor ·while another fails. 15 STAND. ENcrc. oir P.aoctDuu:•. 81. In· aD
lhese cases the judgment ·does in fact determine a r.ontroversy with three or
more sides.
· It must lie concluded, therefore, that three-sided controversies have
forced. themselves \vithin the jurisdiction of common Jaw courts, and that
the fact that in the principal- case tlie presence ·cf. the· assignor would com·
pticaic the issues and call for a. j"udgment settling a triangular controversy.
is ·no justification in pri11rille for the decision.
·
2. In the principal case the third party $0Ught to be brought HJ. was
not involved in Jhe original- action, bttt in a cross-action. 1r.· so. far as ibis
cross-action operated as a defense,. thus corresponding to tHe .common law
recoupment, it was fully ;i.vailable to the defendant without the 11rcsence of
a third party. But if it was to be used at its full value, resulting in a judgment for the. balance in defendant's favor, the ass~gnor had to he before the
court.
.
Now, in such case, in order·to prevent obvious injustice, the usual rules
of common law procedure :.cannot be permitted to operate. One of two
~ings must be done. Either the third party must be allowed t<> r.ome into
the case, and the tiabilitY "apportioned between the assignee and aslt'ign0r,
which is contrary to orthodox practice; or the defenilant must be authorized

a
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to split his cause of action and use part of jt to extinguish the ptamtiJf's
and the balance as a. separate claim against -the assignor, to be
asserted in a separate suit, which is also contrary to the orthodox rule, which
prohibits splitting a cause of ;action. From the standpoint of convenience it
is clear that bringing jn the third party, when it .can be done, is the better
method. The ci>mmon '3w, howevet, with its technical distrust of ttimpticity,
chose the other method. Confronted by a dilemma which· inevitably called
f9r ·the sacrifice of traditional conventions jn one directiQn or the otlicr, the
single action with three ~rties was passed by in favor of two separate
actions each wjtJo two parties, on the two portions of jbe split demand. Hna·
ntU. v. Fairlamb (180c>), 3 .Esp. 104; l Colu>us Jr;$> 1111.
~e principal case js therefore in harmony with the common law s0Jution, but no reason exists in prin,iple why.courts should not. in. the exercise
of common Jaw powers, allow either solution as tJie occasion requires. The
courts" were foi-ced, jn thls. situation, to do something on their own authority,
without.statutory aid,,and they aHumed jurisdiction. If they had power to
adopt ~e plan, there was· equal power to adopt the other. Why should all
subsequent courts continUe to follow the ·accidental lead of tliat 'Jt'iginal
choice of a remedial alternative?
· ·
·
·
3- The usual American counterclaim statute doe:. not expressly authorize
a cross-demand which involves ne-Y parties, is commonly construed to can)"
no in:.ptied authority to pl~d such a demand. and often forbids it in terms.
Somar.ANJ» CAsts oN Com: PLEADING, 356-364; Taylor v. Afatttso1J (1~).
86. Wis. n3. A very few haYe provided expressly for bringing in new parties. Kansas St., 1909. Secs. 56!>2, ~ The most *iking developnie."tt in
thls field &as been the new Cm1. PiAcr10: Acr adopt'd in New York iD 1930.
. Sec. z,1, which _contains the following provision:
de~d

"Where a defendant sets up any counterclaim which rai.ses questions between .himself and the plaintiff along with any- other pcrson1.
he shall set forth the names of ·au persons ·who, if such counterclaim
were to bC enforced by cross-action, would be ddendants in such crossaction. When any such pcrsc•n is not a party to the action he shall
be summoned to appeas: bY being serv~ with a ~opy of the answer.
A person not i! party to the action .who is so served with an answer
becomes a defendant in, "the action as if he had been tterved with the
. Under the English practice it bas long been customary to bring in third
·parties on counterclaims-QR»~ 21, rule 12; and several British provinces
have similar rules~ Nova Scotia, JUD. Aa, 1921>, Sec. 18(3), and Oa~ 21,
rule n; Ontano, JuD. Acr, Rule UJ. The principal case is a good iltustn·
tion of. the utility of such a provision, whic;h would, in this instance, have
allowed the whole controversy to be settled i.: a single action. The .Englii:ll
practice· provides 1l safeguar<l again!'t the inconvenient ui:e of the p:ivilege
of bringing in third parties; by permitting the third party, when summoned,
~o !'h~ cause why the claim should be prosrcuted by a· separate. suit, 31Jd the
j11Jge m:1y m.,ke such order as. may be jtt!L ORDER 21, rule IS.
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4- The effort made in the principal case on the part of the defmdmrt
to ·secure an order bringing in the assignor under the geaeral statut~ authorizing new partie9 who arc neccssazy to a complete detcrmiiiati~n of the con:trovusy, was doomed to failure under the commonly accepted interpretation
of that statute. It bas been held to apply only fo equitable causes of actiOll
or cross-demands. Chai~ v. Forbes (18go), 123 N. Y~ 538. In the principal case the court distinguished Slate es r'l. AtljtUlmttd Co. v. $t1lerior
Cour~, (q Wash. 355; oti the gronnd that there the counterclaim was not a
mere money demand aaginsf the assignee, but an equitable defense c:a1liq
for affirmative relief.. Another case where the assignor was brought in cn
a counterclaim pleaded against the assignee is Gildn-sltftlt v. Bu"0tr1s (18;3).
24 Ohio St. 264. where the c:Ounterclaim was an equitable set-off. To be sure.
the statute contains no express restriction to equitable actions and crOl!demands, but the inevitable tendency to limit the scope of procedural inJlo.
vations 1:1a& fixed this implied restriction.
·
5; The. whole question of third parties coming into actiops at Jaw ~
r~eived a broad and generous stimµlus in England and same of the Britisla
dC?miIJions through· rules authorizing so-called Third Party Prcced~~
whereby any defendant entitled to contribution or indemnity oYtt apimt
any other person not a 11arty to the action may by leave of c0urt biiac smell
party in, and thereby have -the whole coritrever!)'; inclµding the ~
or contribution, settled iri a single· action. England, 0JlDEIC 16, rule 4J_ Tiie
practice is widely employed ;md has. demonstrated its great utility.
.
6. It is apparent that the principil case, w~e rightly decided under tile
~rrent authorities, exhibits the vcey low s!ate of procedural d~~
from which we suffer in this "country, and .suggests the need of both a more
progressive attitude ·on the part o( .our courts- and a more.cliliRhtened 1~
Jative policy.
·
E. · R. S.
"TBE FAJULY AUTOMOBJLE"-LtABJUTV OF OWNE& F6R·ITS NECLte!!IT

A MUIBER ·i>F

Usit

Hts FA1nx.v.-Thc advent of the ",family autol!DObile• bu
brought with it the question as 10 the .liability of an owner of a machine,
which he buys for the pleasure and ccnvenience of his family, for injuries
resulting from the negligent use thereof by a member.of his family, with bis
consent. A recent case, Spence v. Fisher (Cal, 1920), 193 Pac. 2SS. ..reftects
the confusion and divergence of opinion. upon what has become known .u
the ..family purpose" doctrine of liability.
·
0£ courst\ it is universally admitted that the mere fact of ov.-nership
does not make a father liable fOr the negligent acts of his child in the use
of the car. Nor does the mere relationship of parent and child make the
former liable per st. Erlick v. Hris, 19,1 Ala. 66g, ~ So. 530: It is substan.tia}ly agreed that the father is liable if ihe child is acting as· his actual agent
in· driving the machine. J.forrison ,.. Clark, 14 Ala.. App. 323. 10 So. 2)1).
And in accordance with the general principles of agcney, he is not liable if
the child steps out of his position as agent by making a deviation fr'll!l bis
father's business for his own pleasure. ]1AiJJgs v. Oiilt> 88. N. J. L 659.
BY
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. Atl. 249- Thu!, aho,.be is not liabl~ if the child has taken the .car· against
his command. Johnston.v. Corn~liiu, 193 Mich.. tlS~ ·I~ N. W. 318.
At this p0int .the 'divergence of opinion begins, arid it-sccms
the ~ritcr
that at t1ie root of tliis seemingly irreconalabte c0nflict upon this doctrine
of Imputed negligence-lies the &ilure to claSsify the various
a~~rding
to their. fundamental facts. In practically all of the- .caSCS in this field the
facts: involve _the purch~e apd maintel)ance ·by ·the head of th~ farmly of a
maclline.for th~ pl~ure,.use and c~cni~ oi the fa~ly, the express or
implied consent tQ its. use by a11y mem1:ier of the family, ·a subscqu~t "negliBJmt qse by one of". the family, :and• ··re51lltlnk injury to a· third party,. ·for
wliich suit .is· brougl_ii apiiun}Je he;&d of. the· famuy. · Behind this· sktlcton
Qf. facts lit qthcr facts that· form the basiS· o( a .clasSificatioR that helps· one
make·his way -'1itough.;wliat has bren cail~ a "tradciess for~t·of cases."
· First,-~ere·are ·the casn -w}lere thc·clnfd. mosi:ofttri a..son, is the family
chatlfftur, whei:e· the f~hU is ·the tcgjstettd "owner of the·· c;ar, but the son
is the only.~scd driver in th~ family. ·ln wc1! ~inly_~crc. is a patent.
relationship .or p~ &nd agent ·or mlStcr ·:and. worker, m whi~ll, b)' -the
application Qf me dllctrhie·"Gi res~ctt 5'1P'rior, the f~ .tan-~ held
liable ·for the n~igcnt a.Cts of..his apJ>('inkd diivcr.. lo this class are Smill.
Y. )or,Ji(llJ, 2n Mass. 2fi9. 'fl N.·Ei ~:Dail~ ·V••v~n. ·~Yo. App: 41S:
. JjJ
35i; 110.,,,, .,. Wlrihna•1: ~ Mass. ISS, 95 N.. ·E..
_and" Leti1ir
v. Steelr, ·53· J,lont.· :300. ·151·. P.&· 575.. all -often-cited as upholdin~ a much
broader doctrine.Of
Secon~ there are ·the-~~ the negTigent member. o( ;he ·family
is drivfug ~n--of the wnily, either. at tJi-e ~rcss command cif lhe
falher" or in obeditnCe lo an i.mpllcd .request ·to drive tJtem about. in ·sirch

·to

eases

a

s. w.

4o4;

.tiabiiitJ.:.

·

cases·the ma"thine_li \leiiii:ased fa! tlie~· for whi~·the.pat,,. ~ilitu
PllJ'chaScd ud niairitaint.'11 ·tt~ -:the· plmiitt nd CCtWcnience of bis family
At the iiinc· pf the aceidenf ntani(cstly the c:hild is thl: agent of his .father.
cari'Jing out the .. jmrpostS" of his father. Qs·'lllt1Ch ~ jf the-owner had ·hirei
third -person outside .the- f~ to aci·.as chauffeur: M cN.~al v. :McKair..

a

.33 9Jcla.M9."?36"Pac. 74t (drividg·~);_L~mke v."Ads"C~a.. 1916).·I~
N. W. 1oir-(dri¥ing JD(Jther).
·
·
Trurd, .iben,·aie the cases where- the-Child. granted ·permission.to use th<
machine for bis own purposes; at. the- .titlle
the -•ccidcnt •it driving aloni•
or· vrlth persons. other than memberS <if ha family~ Iii~ in this last cl.rs~
alone that the real conflict of.opiri}jm arises.. S0me Courts haYO adopted the
..fawiy purpose~· doctrine -in. its· ftt.11 scope, and "have unqualifiedly applit-d it

of

even wh~re the ,child was driving .for his own Pii.tl>ose. i:>n 1h~ theory ~t
car at "the time of ~he accident was being uS'Cd. for the pu~e or busi·
· ness for which it vi:ls kept, and that thc•person operating ·it, .therefore, -as
acting as the owner's· agent.Qr. servant in using it. .·Birch .v. Abrrcrombk,·i-1
W.ash. 486, · 133 ·~ 1020; Btnlon. v. Rrg"n-; 20 Ariz. 273. 179 Pac. 966';.
Pliuch· v. Fa# (Minn., 1919), 174 N.
4,.i&· (wi(e was driving .for own
pi~r.e whit~ ·husband was ·out· of ~e slate). On the otbCr hand, other
have- squardy rejected this doctrine of liabilitY on the ground' that
the vieW asserting ·liability str.riils the toP.: of ·the si~tion ~ .unwarran~
th·~
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cdly stretches the principles of agency. s,nrce v. Fllber, 611#a; Dtwn v.
Thomsm, '6 N. J. L. 754. 71 AtL 29(); Arki# v. Pare (IU:, 1g19), 123 N.-E.
30; Vars Blaricom v. Dodgso.n, 220 N. Y. III, ns N. E. 443; Woltins +.
Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. I3L
The view upholding liab_ility mthis last class of cases is founded upoa
what has been called th~ ''somewhat attenuated'.' theory that a minor in
amusing himself is acting as· agent in his father's bcbatf. A parent, these
tn"bunals argue, owes .a .duty of furnishing rcercation and pleasure. to hi•
children, and when they employ themselves in p\U'suit of such recreation and
amusement they become his agents. Burch, J., in Watlei1&1 v. Clark, ~pro.
waxes sarcastic over this theory·
·
"So," he points out, "if daughter took her friend riding she might think
she was -out merely for her "own pleasure: but she was mistaken; she was
·ccnducting father's 'business' as bis 'agent.' • * * If son took bis best git'l
riding, Pr!ma f acie it was father's little outing by proxy, and if any accident
happened, primCJ facie father was liable."
As the New York Court of Appeals said in YaJS BlaricOllS v. Do4ts0fl,
svpra, holding the father. liable for the negligent acts of bis cluld while lhe
latter was using the family car for his own convenience or pitasurc, while
engaged exclusively on ·a mission of bis own, is certainly "an adWnccd propositioo in the law of principal and agent," presenting "a case of mcb theo-·
rctical ·and attenuated agency, if any. as would be beyond the recognition of
sound principles of law as they arc ordinarily apPticd to that relationship."'
"The d~ine that the pleasure of the family in its utmost detail.is the
business of the father has no firm foundation in ~ ~r common sense..
In theory it over)ooks well-settled principles of law.; in practice it would
interdict the father's g"°erosii, arid his rcasoiiabte care fat the pleasure or
even. the well-being of liis (hildren hy imposing a \Uliversal rcspomibility 'for
their acts." Parker Y. WilsoJS, 179 Ala. J6r, 6o So. 1.so.
The tribunals asserting universal liability ·really base the" creation of the
relation of master and SerY!lJlt, whic:Jl they read into the fads,. Upon th~
purpose which the parent had in mind i1r purchasing the car: and in permittmg
the fainily to use it. This proposition plainly ignores an essential clement
in the creation of that sCl.tus as to third persons; such use must be in furtherance of, ·and riot apart from, the master's· service and control. lt fails
to distinguish between a mere permission to .use and a use su~jcct, to the
control of the master and connected· with bis affairs. Dorars v. TliomseJS •
.supra. The purpose of the parent in buying the car cannot of itself create
the rclationshlp contended for. Hoss v. Hogors. 2;3 Mo. I, 200 s,
286.
reversing 18o .Mo. App. 237, 165 S. W. 1125.
Weighing the, arguments of the two lines of eases, the bctt(r reason
seems to be with those which
liab.ility when "the child is out for a"spin"
of. his own. The· trend of the latest ..decisions is towards· this view. The
argument that the- pleasure and recreation of the family is the father's business, carried to its logical conclusion, would make the -father.absolutely liable
for c~ery tort of every member of the family white such nirmber is sccl.-ing
his ow~ pleasure. If the doctrine is sound, ArkiJS v. Page. n-pra, points out.
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·it ought to be equally applii;abl~ where the thing used is a bicycle, horse, guit,
golf-clubs, etc:. Yet, it is very probable that even the courts upholding this
view·. would deny the .existence of a master and se~ant relationship upon
whicli to base liability in cases involving these. It.is interesting to note that
tl)e liab_ility of a f~ther .has been denied in the case of a horse being driven
by his son. Madt!ox v. Broum, 71 Mc. .(52..
·
. A ctQse exUtlnation of the reasoning of 'the courts which accept this
pr0positi~ which is. scemingty contradict<!rY on its very face, asserting, as
it,docs. that a person who is wholly and exclusively engag~ in the prosecutiOI\ of bis OWD conc~ms is, nevertheless, engaged
agent in doing. something for someone else, shows that, in truth, there runs through practically
all of the cases an under-current of the idea:· that because an automobile is
more dangerou~ wJicn ·earelessly. used than most other family agencies .there
shQuld be ~ ex_tension.of. ~ established doctrine of agency to safeguUd
"its use.
.
.
..
.
··1n }Jir;,; v. Abttcrombk~ n"Pra, the..c9urt said:. "Any other view would
~ a premium upon the failure of an .f?wner to employ a competent chauffeur
to, drive a car .kc.pt for the' use of ~e members of the family. The adoption
of a d~rme .5;0 callously technical would be little sh~ of calamitous."
Kir19.v. Sm:1tlw, 142 'fenn. 217, 204 S.
296, denies that an automobile
is ~uch a darigeroU.s agency,_ In- si~ as to make its owner· liable. universally,
yet it a~ that it hol!fs a f~ther liable for its negligent tise by his son
because ~f "the dangeroµ~ character of automobiles."
.
Adopt this view of tlie nature of the autopiobile and, as one judge put
it. you change the ol_d maxim read, "011i iacit per a1do faril pw se." The
difl!culty is that practically every ccurt which has passed on the question
squarely has r.cpudiatcd any such doctrine that an automobile is within ~
rule making the o'liner of an inherently ·dangerous instrumentality ~le for
the use thereof by any person. T3•kr v. StelhNI-, 163 _Ky. TIO.. 1;4 S: \V. 190:
Premier Motor Mf11. Co. v. Tilford, 61 Ind. App. 16.t, in N. lt 64s. But

as
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to

sec So11!'fomr.' ()ii Co. v. A~ttS<?fl, itlfra.
• . One of. two altcmativ_cs faces _the court: either they must. considering
the~t ii\~~ i~- the n~ of "family cars" and their resulting" negligent use by reckles~ young drivers on crowded streets, desert their old ideas
the danger of the automobile, and henceforth recognize it as an instru111cntality within the rule whereby o'Wncrs of dangerous agesicies a.re held
lial>l~ for their use by any person (except in cases of independent acts or
~ of God) i or ~e !~statures of the several states must come to their
aid with statutes fixing the liability of ,the owners. The attenuated agmC)
theory will not staniL
·
A most recent case dealing with the negligent use of an · automobile
own~ by a corporation while being driven by one of its agents goes exhausthel;j ~to ..the history of aut~mobile accidents in "the United States in the
Past few years, and shows that the time has come to recognize the machine
..- an inherently dangerous aJcncy. SDllthmJ OU Co. v. Anderson (Fla.,
1920), 86 So. fi2s>. It is submitted that liability established on such ground
~ far ·~ore reasonable than on the agency theory.
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Yet it seems that, after all, it is not the ferocity of the automobile that
is to ·be feared, but the ferocity of those wlfo drive them· Considering that
the vehicle is one that in the hands of reckless drivers spreads over the land
the maimed and dead until, as one court put it, "it has belittled the cruelties
of the car of Juggernaut," con~idering that parents who entrust such agenci~
in the hands of reckless minors should in all justice. be liable for injuries
inflicted by them, and taking into ac:count the undoubted practjcal considCl'-·
tions in :favor of the doctrine of respondeat superior, since it puts the financial responsibility of the owner, who can insure himself, behind the car while
it is being used by a member of the family, who is likely to be financially
irresponsible, it seems liabili~ should fall on the pa.rent. Admitting the rule ·
to be fair, it must be created by Jcgislative enactment, not by. a judicial dist9rtion of the principles of agency.
.
For a discussion of such statutes, see·19 MICH. L RJ:v. 333, and 6 COKNo.i.
LAW QuAtt. 181,-where the writers adOP.t opp0site views as to the ~idity
of a.Michigan statute.
H. A. A.

PuBLtc UTILITY RAus-STAT£ Pow.ER oVn1 MUNICIPAUTY'.-Udder coq·
stitutional authority,: a city gave its consent to ·the construction of ·• street
railway on· condition; among other thirigs, that the company enter intit :a
contract fix.ing rates of fare. The company asked of the Public Servi<:e
Commission an ord~ raising the rat~ so fixed, on the ground that the ~- 1
tract rates -had become unreasonable. Hell, that wbJ1e the contract rates
may be binding as between the parties to the contract, they have no binding
force. when in conflict with· rates fiXed by a state commission· in the. manner
prescribed by the stitutc. Cit)• ~I Scranton v. Pflblie SnTJice Co•. (Pa.,
June, 1920), no AtJ. ·17S.
. It has often been suggested that power to fix ram is one of the police
powers of sovereignty that is never to be presumed to 1>e given up unless it
is clear beyond doubt. 18 Mica. L REv. 8o6, 19 ib. n2; Richmond v. C. &
P. Tel. Ct>." (Va., 1920), 105
E. 127; Hoyne v. Eln1tJted Co. (Ill., 1920),
120 N; E. ,s87. In ChcirleitoK·v. P11b. Serv. Com (W."Va., 1920), 103 ·s E. ·
673. the court distinguishes between matters of prOPrietary right .in
a.
sovereign state may permit a municipatit1 to make an inviolable contract
and those phases of police power relating to public safety~ health, and morals.
It ms been intimated that the power to fix permanent rates may llc considered to be a power which cannot be surrendered by the state Chicago Rys.
Co. v. Chicago, 292 Ill. 190 (1920); Niagara Falls v. Pt1b. Sert1. Com. (N. Y.,.
1920), 128 N. E. 247; Camdrn v. ArAansas C. If P. Co. (Ark., 1'2(>), 224 S.
W. 444- Municipalities and companies are conclusively presumed· to know
this when they become parties to a contract, and therefore to know "that
the 5overeiin police "power of the state to mod.ify.its terms would be supreme
whenever the general well-being of the public so req!JirCd,•• as the court
puts it in the instant case. But cf~ Ottum'Ula Co•. v. Oltt1mWtJ (Ia., 1920), 178
.N. W. 905. Bu.t this is a rule that should work both wayi. · If the state in
its sovereignty can raise the r.ates in favor of the ut:tity, then equally io
proper case it should be able to lower contract rates in.favor of the public..

s:

which

MICHIGAN L.4W REYJBW
If this is a sovereign power which cannot be tturrendcred, then the state
should. be able to change rates contracted for with the state itself, as well
as those made by its consent by contract to which the municipality is a party.
Under. such a provisioD as ~t of the· Constitution of Pennsylvania-"The
aercise of the police power of the state shall never be abridged, or so construed as to permit corporations. to conduct their business in such manner
as to infringe the equal rights of individuals or the general well-being of
the state"-<ithcr provisions of franchises should be subjc,ct to the same rule.
the extent of such power in the state to changt- f~chise or contract
provisions would be bounded only by the definition of police p0wer. This
seems-good sense and good Jaw, but it is capable of extension to many caSH
that Lave been treated as contract matters only, though involving matten
very closely touching the "general well-being of the state.".. This gets entirely
· away from the doubtfUt position tliat a municipality in making such contracts
is an agent of the state, and the state as prindpal- may consent to a chanee
in the contract made by the agent. even tliou1h the agent has to pay the price.
There is no true contract situation of agenq there. 18 Jl~ca. L. ~- 8o6.
',l'he company, it woufd sec.m, is bound by. the limitatit'DI of the" contract
until the state consents to a change, and till then cannot charge. more than
the maximum rates agreed 'to·· in the franchise, even though it· can operat~
at those rates only at a "toss. The public, however, camiot compel operation
at a loss. The. company may quit. CliarltnOll-lsle of Plllnu. Tf'actioa Co.
v. Slital~·~ a(J6 Fed. 406 (June, Igl(>). Not much has been said about the
rights of° a city which has comented to the Use of iti streets OD a codtract
fixing farei at a certain pric;r~ But if the state may release the con\pan7
from its agreement as to price, can the company insist on its right to stand
on the other terms.of the contract with the city? It would .eem that if the
city was granted. the ·power to pve or withhold its consent. it should have
the power to withdraw such consent when .the coinpany no Jenger lives up
to the terins on- which it Wa! given. It was so hetd in Aferidia~ L. & R Co.
v. "Mtritlian,.:165 Fed. '65 (May, I~). In this case it Seemed the city had
no authority to contract as to the rates. and" still the court said if th~ company enjoyed the privilege it must.assume the bur~ens ·on which they were
granted, and a court could not p t relief, though it would bring di!astcr
~n the company .to refuse. . The court intimated that the legislature could
grant higher fares, but if the constitution gives the city contiol over Consent
. to occuPY. the streets, how. does the legislature have power to nullify the
· conditions on which the con.~t was given, and yet prevent the city from
withdrawing its consent? Few ca.ces recogniz~ any rights in the city :as
against th~ legislative act raising rates, even.though the city is bound by its
-part of the contract. P•ib. Stt'fl. Com. y. Gif'lcm (Ind.; 1920), ~28 N•.E. 69<>;
· Riclimontl Y••c. & P. Tll. C• (Va., 1g20). 105 s. E. IZJ.
Cases coiitinu~ to appear in wbith titita assume to fix a permanent price
fQr' semce when no. such power has been conferred 1lPOD· them. See °Olhlmtoo
R. & L. Co• .v. OttumWiJ (la.. 1920), 1,S N. W. gos, which does not agree
to the doctrine that a· COJitract for perinancni rate in.fringes SOVCl"eignty:
Warsaw v. Pavilio" Nat. Gas Co., 182 N. Y. S. I73. which holds tlm no con-
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tract can defeat ·legitimate governmental authority; PtoJle u rel 4 Co. v.
P11b. Serv. COM.,.183 N. Y. S. 473. invofyjns a rate in city limits for a railroad which was not a street railway.
·
Emergency increases in rates are justified in some case$ ip these troublous ·
after-war 'times. La Cross~ v Railroad Com. (Wis., 1920), 178 N. V{. 267.
The general discontent arouSed by raising of raffS by commissions· bas 1cd
some _legislatures to withhold from commissions power ever rat~ fixed by
contract with a municipality. M1cBIGAN Ac::rs 1919, 753; Mobile v. Mobilt'
Ekctrk Co.· (Ala., 1920}, 84 s0. 816; Richmond v. C.
P. Tel. Co. (Va.,
1920), 105 S. E. 127, though ;n New York the restriction.is limi~·to franchises and contracts subsisting when the amendment to the act wu. passed.
Nn11 York .Cjly v. Niro~ °CN. Y., 1920), 12.S N. E. 245; NioF11 F°"8 v.
P11b. St"1. C01?f., ib. 247: Peo~li es rel•.Gt1rriso,. v. J{ison, ib.
Jn most
·cases there is no such limitation on the j>ower of the commission to incttase
rll,tes. · P11b. Serv. Com. v. Girt"" (Ind., 1920). 128 N. E. 6go; H~ •·
Chirago
0. P. B. Co. (Ill, 1920), 128 N. E. s8'/; A SO"Called Home
Charter provision in the con!'titution does- not prevent JegislatiYe eoatrol ol
rates. Ditroit v. Micb. R. Com. (Mich.. 1920), 177 N. W. ,306. This power
of commissions over rates bas rttently been exercised .&re often in nio
where the· cont~ing parties were ·the company and the munic:iJ!ality, but it
is equally applicable to rates fixed in a contract between a public ·utility arid
an individual. Rt411aud R. L & P. Co. v: Burdill Bros. (Vt.. 1920), n1.AtL
s82, citing, -among Others, the ti-ading case of [.Tniots Dry Goods Co. v. GL
Pub. Stru. Cort., 142 S. E. 8.p, aff., 248 U. S. 312; P11b. UliiilW1 Co&•·
Wichita R.
L Co.: 268 F~ 37 (~ 1920}; O,,io & ColOFolo. d~.,
v. PUblic Utilities Com•. (Colo., 1~), 187 Pac. 1o82. .
E:C. G.
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ExolttlAmlf.-la. cases where

a ·municipality has been called upon to respond in damages because of its
legal duty to keep sidewalks free from obrtructiom, but where the obstraetion was caused by the negligence of a third person, it is clearly established
by a long line·of decisions tbo&t the· municipality may recover against the
person wbose negligence was the real cause of the injury. ·See a ieview of
the cases in note in ·1.. R. A. 1916F. 86..
·
·
· These indemnity aelions seem to be' in the n~ture· of quasi contractual
actions, and the theory upon which they are based is much ·the same as that
in the cases where a surety is allowed' contn1>ution from his co-sureties.
That this right of.contn"bution in;.suretyship eases is not based upon aDJ
true contractual relationship, either express or implied, is clearly shown bj
the ca;;e of Deering v. Wincheltta, 2 B. & P. 270, where if was held that the.
right of contribution .among sureties exist." evat in cases where tbe obligations of the several sureties . are evidenced by ·separate bonds, as well as.
where they are bound in the ~me instrument.. Arid in Nono" v. CoOJU, 6
·N. Y. 33. it was held that the right to ~ve c~l\tn°bution exists. though the
surtties became Such at different times and without ·each other's knowledge. .
In the
where a municipality brinis an indemnity acti.oa against.a
negligent landowner, the courts do not State. yery clear~ what the tliCOl')' of
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acti~ is, some of them going so far as to say that it is immaterial what
tbeor)' the action is based upon.. But it seems clearly to be quasi contractual
in its nature. The quasi contract is based upon the concurrent liability of
the city and the landowner. Tb~ injured"party may sue the lando~er whose
negligence was respotisible for the injury, he may join the city as a co-defendant, or he may sue the city alone, and in any event there· will be a
recovery. But the landol'fDU is primarily liablt, since it was bis nqligence
which caused the injury. When the city is compelled to _respond in damages
to the injured party, the landown~ is thereby released from.the tort liability,
and .to that extent has been enriched at the expense of the city. This enrichment creates & duty· binding upon him to indemnify the city for an)'thiq it
has had
pay out because of ~ negligence. And this duty is clear17 of
a quasi contractual nature. See WOOJ>WAU ON QUASI CoNDACTS1 Section
An entirety different, and somewhat novel, situation Was preaaited in a
recent Missouri decisiOD'.. City_ of S1ri119field v. Ck,,itlll (A~.. 1920), 225
S. W. uo. Jn. that case.a landowner had negligently permitted water spouts
Oil bis building"to remain in leaJty condition, sO as to cause
formation of
ice on the ·sidewalk, resql~i ~ the injury of· a ped~ian. . The injured
party sued the city and recovered. Before that suit was brouPt, however,
the owner of the building died, and.bis estate was fuDy a~erecto After
judgment had been· recovered· _J>y the ~jured PartY aPinst ~ city, thiS
indemnity actio~ iias brought ~ the heirs of the landOWDa", their liability
being predicated iipon assets d~ to ~_cm by the decedent. In allowmg
a recovery the court said:'
do not think: it material as to a scientific
..dassification of the plaintiff's cause of action.· It is suf&cient to lc:now- that
the 'relatic>nsbip between this plaintiff and Milligan to Miss Abbott's cause
of action and to eack oiher was and is such that the plaintiff is entitled tp
recover indemnity fbr,haying to pay the Abbott judgment. It is nnt material
whether su4 ~hip was brought about by an express contract, an
impli~ Contract, or an obligation impoled \7 Jaw..•
·
Although this decision ~cached. a just result, it is diffiCult to find a ·108'.:
icaI justificatian for it. The court distinctly said th&t it was unmaterial
· what the theory of the action "was, but such a position seems untenable. It
might. indeed, be very material in some ca~ to detcnnin~ what theory the
action is based upon. The action unquestionably docs not sound in. tort,
although .that was contended for by the defendants. If it did, it is ·conceded that the ·action could not survive the death of the landowner. But
~e is aisO a distinct difficulty ·in ·establishiq quasi contraCtuaf relationship such as we have in the ordinary indemnity !uit. For here the landowner
was rel~_from bis tort liabii"ity, not by the payment of ·the'jucJiment b7
the city, but by his death, which oecurred befere the action had been brought
against the cltf. It is diflicttit ~ make out ~ duty f?f the Jan®wner to the
dt;y at the time .of bis cJeath. .And yet, uuless there was some duty restiq
upc)n him before his death, this decision cannot be justified on any logical
bUis. It woul4 be merely a peremptory decisio11 in favor of tJte city. But
is it not possible to establish such a duty by relating it back to the original
nqligent a~ or·· omiSsion JO act; of the l;ando1'ner 1 This, indeed, seems
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to be the only logical soluµon of the difficulty. On such a thtory the owner
cf the building, by his negligenc~ comes immediately under a duty to exonerate the city, to save the city harmless. This duty will survive his death.
While this duty doei not seem to fit into any of the more familiar legal·
categories, either tort, contract, or quasi contract, that · fact raises no vital
objection. There could be no doubt as to the power of a legislature to impose.
such a duty. See City of Rochtsltr. v. Campbell, 8 N. Y. Supp. 252- ·That
being so, it is not juridicially impossible to conceive of such a duty based
solely upon principles of equity. Such an equitable duty upon the laniowncr
is closely analogous to the equitable duty ol a principal to .exonerate bis
surety, a duty which is related to;but djstinct from, the duty to reimburse
after payment hy the surety. See extensiye note in L. R. A. 1918 C, to. See
also a -Very interesting analysis by Mr. Street in his work on the FouirnA'tlON
OF LEGAL l.IABILtTitS, Vot 2, page 2~.
· ·
P. W. G.

